A History of the Peninsular War, Vol. 5, Oct. 1811-Aug. 31, 1812

A History of the Peninsular War, Vol. 5, Oct. 1811-Aug. 31, 1812 - Valencia, Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, Madrid

In this volume Wellingtons campaigning in 1812 is followed no further than the day (August 31st) on which he set out from Madrid to drive back Clausel from the Douro. Reasons of space make it impossible to include the siege of Burgos and the retreat which followed. I had written the narrative of them, but found it impossible to add six long chapters to the 620 pages already in print. The fact is that, from the point of view of Wellingtons army, the year 1812 was much more tightly packed with military events than any which had gone before. In 1809 there was nothing important to chronicle after August: in 1810 the Anglo-Portuguese did not come into the forefront of the war till July, when Massna had crossed the frontier and laid siege to Almeida. In 1811 the year opened with a deadlock, which was only ended by the commencement of Massnas retreat on March 9th, and concluded with a similar deadlock which endured from July to Decemberinterrupted only by the short campaign of El Bodon and Aldea da Ponte, and this covered only a week [Sept. 22-9]. In 1812 the great strategical operations began on the first day of the year with the concentration for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and did not end till the last week of Novemberwhich saw Wellington once more encamped under the walls of that fortress. For eleven months on end he had been on the move, with only[p. iv] a brief rest in cantonments between April 24th, the day when he gave up his pursuit of Marmont in Northern Portugal, and the end of May, when his divisions began to assemble again for the projected march on Salamanca. But for this short break his operations were continuous, and the narrative of them must of necessity be lengthy. The campaign of 1812 cannot be called the greatest exhibition of military genius in Wellingtons career: that distinction must be given to the campaign of 1813. But it included the battle of Salamanca, the most skilfully fought and the most decisive of all his victories, the beating of forty thousand men in forty minutes. And its earlier episodes, the two sudden strokes which ended in the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and of Badajoz, deserve the closest attention, as showing a marvellous power of utilizing opportunities, and solving time-problems of the most complicated sort. We shall see how Wellington, in face of an enemy whose whole force was far superior to his own, so conducted his operations that he had success in his hands before the French armies could concentrate to overwhelm him. He would have been victorious in 1812 even without the assistance that was given him during the early months of the year by Napoleons misguided orders from Paris, and in the summer by Soults repeated and deliberate refusal to co-operate with King Joseph and Marmont for the general welfare of the French cause in Spain. The limits of his success were largely extended by those adventitious circumstances, but even without them he must have achieved great things by force of the combinations which he had prepared. [p. v]The reader will find that I have devoted a good deal of space to the precise working out of the effect of Napoleons successive dispatches to Marmont, with reference to the time at which each was received, and the influence which it had on the Marshals movements. I am bound to say that careful study has convinced me that Marmonts justification of his own actions from January to May, written in the fourth volume of his Mmoires, is in the main fair and sensible, and that his criticism of his masters orders is as sound as it is lucid. Napier held the reverse opinion, but his arguments in support of it are unconvincing: he is set on proving his idol infallible at all costs, in this as in so many other cases. ......Buy Now (To Read More)

Product details

Ebook Number: 62291
Author: Oman, Charles
Release Date: May 31, 2020
Format: eBook
Language: English